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Abstract—Counterfeit products have been a major concern
in global market. There are many procedures for preventing
the counterfeiting of goods, such as holograms, tamper-resistant
packaging etc. However, there is still a rising trend in counterfeit
goods. With the emergence of RFID systems, supply chain man-
agement is able to detect counterfeit products relatively easily.
Existing techniques generally involve a centralized database and
can only be implemented in an online scenario. This deprives
the individual customers of using any authentication mechanism
while making purchases due to the infeasibility of accessing a
central database. In this paper, we analyze a recently published
semi-offline scheme proposed by Alex et al. We identify limita-
tions and weaknesses in this scheme and suggest solutions. We
modify the framework to remove the main weakness and extend
it to the consumer level so that a consumer can determine the
legitimacy of a product. This involves Near Field Communication
technology (NFC) which is now widely available in cell phones
– the consumer’s cell phone acts as an RFID reader and detects
counterfeit products. Our solution is completely offline as it
does not require a central database for product authentication.
It is based on Public Key Cryptography (PKC) and a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI). It offers dual layer authentication
mechanisms to customers, visual and cryptographic, without
accessing the supplier’s database. The main beneficiary of the
proposed framework is the consumer who uses the Internet for
online shopping and can authenticate a product reliably after
delivery. Our scheme is stand-alone and does not require the
transfer of any secret values from a centralized authority.
Index Terms—Anti-Counterfeit Products; EPC Tags; Off-line
Authentication; Near Field Communication (NFC).
I. MOTIVATION
Counterfeit products are one of the major threats to mod-
ern commerce. According to estimates by the Counterfeiting
Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), counterfeit goods make up 5 to 7% of
world trade [1]. Counterfeits are available in a wide range
of products, typically starting from high value small goods
like watches, designer clothes, DVDs and electronic chips to
high cost items such as cars, motorcycles and bicycles.
Counterfeit products are classified into four categories [2].
1) The first category consists of those products that are
inexpensive, lower quality and may lack original pack-
aging. This category is often called ‘knockoff’. These
products are being sold as counterfeits and the consumer
is aware of it.
2) In the second category of counterfeit, a genuine product
is reverse engineered and identical copies are sold as the
genuine product. It is hard for a consumer to differen-
tiate between a genuine and a counterfeit product. This
category is meant to deceive the consumer.
3) These are the products that are produced by an out-
sourced manufacturer without intimation to the original
owner. For example, an outsourced manufacturer manu-
factures further product after termination of its contract
with the original owner without notifying the original
owner.
4) These are genuine products that do not meet the manu-
facturer’s standards but are not labeled as faulty.
One of the major outlets for counterfeit products is Internet e-
commerce where the consumer has no means of authenticating
a product before delivery. Even after delivery, the consumer
has very limited resources to determine the legitimacy of
a product. Auction websites, such as eBay, have further
expanded the market of counterfeit products. For example, test
purchases from 300,000 Dior products and 150,000 Vuitton
items offered on eBay during 2006 found 90% conterfeits [3].
Tiffany & Co. purchased 186 random items from eBay and
found only 5% to be genuine [4].
These circumstances call for mechanisms to fight counter-
feiting. Analysis shows that the money spent in this way pre-
vented a much greater loss from counterfeit goods. According
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, $5 is gained for every $1
invested in this battle [5].
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags attached to
various goods provide a tool to remotely identify these goods.
Among these, EPC tags are the most important. The Electronic
Product Code (EPC) network is used for supply chain man-
agement and can be used as a tool for anti-counterfeiting [6].
Every item equipped with an EPC tag carries a 96-bit code
to uniquely identify and manage the item in a supply chain.
There are two main approaches to using the EPC as an anti-
counterfeiting measure [7]. The first approach is tracking the
physical location of a tag and updating the result in an online
database. The EPC of a counterfeit product will appear twice
(at least) in the database, assuming the counterfeit product is
equipped with a cloned EPC tag. This is called the ‘Track
and Trace’ approach. The main disadvantage of this approach
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is its significant communication and computation overheads.
Every reader has to update records in the online server in
real time. The online server has to track and trace each code
received from the online reader and generate triggers in case
of any abnormality. In addition to these overheads, there are
also some privacy concerns associated with this approach: for
example, tracking of individuals from the products they carry,
or tracking medicines etc [8]. Moreover, there are some issues
with updating the database. For example, suppose a retailer
were to clone the EPC and attach the cloned tag to a counterfeit
product. Assume he does not update the corresponding record
in the database when it is sold. When he sells the counterfeit
product, the consumer buying the counterfeit can check and
find a valid record for the cloned EPC but will not be able to
update its record to record its sale due to limited access and
privacy concerns.
Another anti-counterfeiting approach is based on crypto-
graphy. In this approach, each tag contains a secret value,
knowledge of which is established by the reader in an auth-
entication proof. Generally, this uses an encrypted challenge-
response protocol as it may be eavesdropped and the secret
cloned if sent in the clear. This approach may be based on
symmetric key or asymmetric key cryptography.
Anti-counterfeiting approach based on cryptography can be
categorized into two main categories. In an Off-line approach,
there is no shared secret between the tag attached to a product
and the reader. Any reader can access the tag and verify its
contents. In case the tag’s contents are verified and the tag
is authenticated, the product is assumed to be a legitimate
one. In the On-line category, there is secret information
shared between a tag and the reader. The reader needs an
access to a server containing a database of secrets in order
ascertain the legitimacy of a product. It is very unlikely that
the login credentials to access the database are provided to
a consumer. This makes former approach more suitable for
product authentication at the consumer level.
If symmetric key cryptography is used, the reader must
already know the secret value of the tag and match it against
the secret value received from the tag. The secret value of each
tag is chosen uniquely so that if a tag is compromised, it should
not break the entire system. This results in a requirement for
a secure and efficient key distribution mechanism to distribute
the tags’ secrets among the readers. One way is to deliver the
secret values of all appropriate tags to readers in advance but
this approach requires secure distribution of millions of such
keys and is considered infeasible. Another way is to store the
key database in an online server. This server is online at all
times to provide the secret values of tags to readers. Assuming
millions of tags are deployed in the supply chain with hundreds
of compatible RFID readers, this approach incurs even higher
communication and storage overheads than the track and trace
approach [7]. In addition, the reader must always be trusted by
the supplier since the reader stores the secret values of the tags
in any framework employing symmetric key cryptography.
As observed earlier, one of the major factors in the upsurge
in counterfeit products is online shopping. With the advance-
ment in Internet technology, the volume of online shopping
is growing rapidly. It is not feasible at present to tailor any
symmetric key approach for product authentication to online
shopping. The reason is obvious: a consumer receiving a
product through online shopping does not possess an RFID
reader to communicate with the tag attached to the product.
Even in the very unlikely scenario where a consumer possesses
an RFID compatible reader, the supplier will have to provide
login credentials to access the database. This situation is far
from practical. Thus, product authentication at the consumer
level remains an open challenge, especially for the Internet
shopping framework.
In contrast to the symmetric key approach, asymmetric key
cryptography (or Public Key Cryptography (PKC)) can also
be used to authenticate a product. Considering the limitations
of the symmetric key approach described above, the case
for PKC in product authentication is thus very strong. The
main restriction in using PKC on RFID tags, such as EPC
tags, is the limited computational and storage capabilities of
these tags. Recently, Alex Arbit et al. presented a working
implementation of a PKC-based anti-counterfeiting frame-
work [8]. They selected WIPR, an ultra-low-power public key
cryptosystem developed by Oren and Feldhofer [9]. WIPR
is a lightweight version of 1024-bit Rabin encryption [10],
with a minimal hardware footprint of under 4700 gates. The
framework presented by Alex Arbit et al. is semi-offline,
where the verification and decryption keys are dispatched to
the reader using a smart card and the reader is considered as
a secure module for storing these keys.
A. Our Contribution
We focus our work on detecting counterfeits that fall into
the categories 2 and 3 mentioned in Section I. Category
1 counterfeits are not a major concern as the consumers
are aware of the fact that the products they are buying are
counterfeits. The loss in the sales of the original product
owner is also negligible as very few genuine goods purchasers
would purchase a knock off [2]. Category 4 counterfeits can
be restricted by enforcing an efficient quality control measure
by the genuine product owner. Categories 2 and 3 are most
critical as not only is the consumer unaware of the illegitimacy
of the product, but also the genuine owner has no or minimal
control over the production, marketing and selling of such
products. Our model helps in detecting counterfeits products
at consumer level pertaining to category 2 and 3 products, thus
providing an efficient tool to detect counterfeits.
In this paper we analyze the anti-counterfeiting model which
Alex Arbit et al. proposed in [8] and highlight a few of
its short-comings. The main drawback of their framework
is its semi-offline structure, which renders it incapable of
authenticating a product at consumer level despite using public
key cryptography.
We revise and extend their work in two main ways. Firstly,
we restore the EPC tag to the original standard rather than
using the modified EPC tag in the Alex Arbit et al. model.
This resolves any modification-related problems in the existing
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EPC framework. Secondly, we supplement the EPC tag with
an NFC tag which can perform the necessary computations
that were not within the capability of the EPC tag. The main
advantage of being offline is that a consumer can authenticate a
product without any online communication with the supplier’s
database. We believe that our offline product authentication at
consumer level can prove to be an efficient anti-counterfeiting
tool. Although our framework is applicable to all levels of
supply chain management, the main beneficiary are customers
using the Internet for online shopping. This framework not
only helps the customers to authenticate a product, but any
verifier such as a law enforcement agency can also use this
model to detect counterfeit products.
We resolve the problem of provisioning of an RFID reader
for product authentication to every consumer by also using
a Near Field Communication (NFC) tag for the EPC. The
NFC tags are RFID tags based on ISO/IEC 14443 operating
in the 13.56 MHz frequency band. NFC technology is now
available on cell phones and so a consumer’s cell phone can
act like an RFID reader to read the EPC. Since our framework
is totally offline, the consumer is able to distinguish between
a legitimate and a counterfeit product by using his cell phone
without accessing the supplier’s database.
We also resolve the issue of trust in the reader for an offline
framework. In the work of Alex Arbit et al, the reader is a
secure module storing a verification key and a decryption key,
as noted earlier in this section. These keys cannot be stored
on any reader that is not trusted by the supplier. Although the
consumer’s cell phone is not trusted by the supplier, this issue
can be addressed by using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
thereby all but eliminating any key storage requirement on the
reader side. In many cases, the NFC tag can also be accessed
and authenticated during product distribution without having
to resort to the greater reading range of the EPC tag.
The first part of the paper introduces NFC technology and
the different types of NFC tags available in the industry.
This is followed by an overview of the EPC network and its
application in supply chain management. Next, related work
in this area is described with a detailed description of the
framework proposed by Alex Arbit et al in [8] and discussion
of some of its shortcomings. This is followed by our main
contribution, which is to modify and extend that work. Finally,
we present a detailed analysis of our proposals which also
highlights some unresolved issues.
II. RFID TECHNOLOGIES
In this section, we introduce the two different classes of
RFID technology that are related to our framework.
A. Near Field Communication
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a wireless technology
that operates at a distance of less than about 4 cm. This
technology is compatible with contactless smart cards based on
the ISO/IEC 14443 standard. The frequency of operation falls
in the HF band operating at 13.56 MHz [11]. The limited 4cm
range means that their use in supply chain management can
be problematic. Access to tags embedded in products which
are packaged in rigid expanded polystyrene foam requires
precise location markers printed on the boxes, and the ability
to place a reader on that location. This may not be possible
in a warehouse.
An NFC link is established between a tag and a reader on a
single touch. This makes it a user friendly technology where
no input is required from a user apart from touching the tag
to the reader. NFC has three modes of operation enabling a
variety of applications: peer-to-peer mode, read/write mode
and emulation mode [12]. The latest mobile phones are
equipped with the NFC technology [13] enhancing the number
of its users. We only focus on its read/write mode of operation
as only this mode is applicable to our proposed framework.
In read/write mode, an NFC device (or NFC equipped cell
phone) acts as an RFID reader/writer to read or write an NFC
tag. NFC tags are, in fact, RFID tags operating at 13.56 MHz
and based on ISO/IEC 14443 standard.
In order to maintain the interoperability of NFC devices and
tags, the NFC Forum (a forum to standardize the applications
related to NFC [14]) has specified four different types of
tags [15]: Type-1, Type-2, Type-3 and Type4. Type-1 has
the least resources in terms of computational power and
memory whereas Type-4 is much more powerful and contains
a cryptographic processor.
B. EPC in the Supply Chain
The EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 (EPC C1G2) standard [16]
specifies low-cost UHF tags which operate in the frequency
range of 860-960 MHz and have a read range of 2-10 metres.
This longer range makes UHF tags more easily read in
containers and warehouses than is the case with NFC tags.
Electronic Product Code (EPC) tags are typically deployed
in supply chain management systems for automated inventory
checks. The EPC is a 96-bit identifier stored in the EPC tag
which helps to identify each tagged product uniquely. EPC
has various advantages over existing product identification
techniques, e.g. barcodes, as the former does not require line
of sight compared to the latter. Moreover, the EPC tag may
store additional information about the product which cannot
be achieved using a barcode. Because of these advantages,
barcodes are often being replaced by EPC tags in the supply
chain.
III. RELATED WORK
The EPC network as an anti-counterfeiting tool was pro-
posed by Staake et al. [6]. The proposal is based on a
central database server and does not explicitly cover the use
of cryptography. The BRIDGE project [7] analyzed various
anti-counterfeiting approaches based on RFID tags. This work
analyzed the secure distribution and management of secret
keys in a symmetric key anti-counterfeiting framework, and
showed that it results in ten times more communication
and computational overheads than in a track-and-trace anti-
counterfeiting system.
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Fig. 1. Alex et al anti-counterfeiting framework( [8], fig. 2)
An NFC based tag authentication framework is proposed
by Saeed and Walter in [11]. They proposed a framework that
can distinguish between a legitimate NFC tag and a cloned
NFC tag without relying on a central database server. Their
proposal is based on public key certificates and a PKI.
Work to reduce the computational overheads in public key
cryptography is also in progress and various lightweight public
key cryptosystems are being designed. The CRYPTOGPS is a
light-weight public-key cryptosystem mainly suitable for UHF
RFID tag. It can be implemented in around 2800 GE (Gate
Equivalent) with a processing time of around 720 cycles [17],
[18]. The Rabin Cryptosystem was the first to be implemented
in a wireless sensor network in [10]. It took about 16,700
GEs to implement 512-bit encryption. This led them to declare
that this cryptosystem was unsuitable for resource-constrained
RFID tags. A lower version of this scheme, WIPR, was
introduced in [9]. It is well suited to RFIDs because it has
the smallest hardware footprint and largest payload capacity
of all published high-security public key schemes [8]. Alex
Arbit et al proposed an anti-counterfeiting framework based
on WIPR that uses 1024 bit keys with a hardware footprint of
just 4700 GEs.
A. The Alex Arbit et al Anti-Counterfeiting Model
Alex Arbit et al proposed an anti-counterfeit model based on
EPC tags and Public Key Cryptography [8]. Their framework
is described in Figure1. The figure represents the various
entities involved in the anti-counterfeiting framework. The
framework consists of the following sequence of operations.
• Step 1: The framework is initiated by the Tag Integrator,
who wishes to deploy anti-counterfeiting technology in
EPC tags. He creates two public-private key pairs: a
Private Signing Key KS together with its Pubic Verifi-
cation Key KV , and a Private Decryption Key KD with
its Public Encryption Key KE . The signing key KS is
never disclosed to any entity of the framework. The Tag
Integrator generates a list of Tag Identifiers (TIDs) and
signs each TID with the key KS . He then sends the
list of signed TIDs to the tag manufacturer along with
the encryption key KE . Since the tag manufacturer lacks
KS , he is unable to generate arbitrary signed TIDs, thus
ensuring the integrity of the TIDs.
• Step 2: The tag manufacturer produces and deploys the
tags, each with an individually signed TID from the list
along with the public key KE .
• Step 3: The reader receives KD and KV from the tag
integrator. Once these keys are delivered to the reader,
the system can operate in an offline framework. The
reader then carries out a challenge-response protocol to
determine that the tag possesses a valid, signed TID.
This is a semi-offline model as it requires an initial key
distribution mechanism to distribute keys to readers through
some secure channel. The authors suggests distributing keys
through a secure module such as a smart card.
B. Weaknesses
There are several weaknesses in this model.
• The framework is semi-offline where the reader stores
KV and KD. This puts a limit on its utility for prod-
uct authentication at consumer level, as KD cannot be
communicated to the consumer.
• KV and KD have to be delivered to a reader through
some secure channel such as a smart card. Since the same
set of keys are distributed to each reader, this results in
a single point of failure where the loss of a single smart
card will compromise the entire system. Moreover, if a
single retailer is dishonest, he can break the entire system
as all the readers use the same set of keys KV and KD.
• The authors have not discussed the storage location and
accessibility of KE inside an EPC tag. If KE is stored at
an accessible location, an attacker can make a successful
counterfeit tag by simply copying all the content of the
EPC tag, including KE , to a counterfeit tag. If KE is
stored at some inaccessible location inside the EPC tag,
it can prevent tag cloning, but still the framework is prone
to single point of failure. Since KE is identical in each
tag, it only needs an adversary to attack a single tag to
compromise the entire system.
• Bypass Attack. The framework is prone to a “Bypass”
attack where the anti-counterfeiting protocol is circum-
vented in a counterfeit tag in the following way. The
framework is designed to handle both WIPR-modified
and standard EPC tags. During the handshake protocol
between a reader and an EPC tag, the tag responds with
an indication of being WIPR modified or not. This is
achieved by the modified tag sending a special WIPR
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Fig. 2. Initialization phase of proposed scheme.
EPC message to the reader instead of the actual EPC
value according to the standard (see Figure 4 in [8]). The
special WIPR message acts as a flag to the reader to
execute the anti-counterfeit protocol.
The framework does not provide integrity protection to
the special WIPR EPC message contents and so alter-
ations to this message may not be detected. An attacker
just needs to replace the message with the actual EPC
value in the counterfeit tag, thereby making the tag claim
to follow standard EPC protocol. On receipt of the actual
EPC value from a counterfeit tag, the reader does not
execute the anti-counterfeiting protocol, instead assuming
the tag to be unmodified as the flag (the special WIPR
message) is not received from the tag. Thus, the anti-
counterfeit protocol is bypassed and the counterfeit tag
remains undetected. Of course, if the reader knows the
TID belongs to a tag which follows the WIPR modified
protocol, then the counterfeit should be detected.
IV. PROPOSED ANTI-COUNTERFEIT OFFLINE MODEL
In this section, we propose a different anti-counterfeiting
model that uses RFID technology to detect counterfeit prod-
ucts. This model is a modified version of the Alex Arbit et
al. [8] model. We add an NFC chip to the EPC tag, thereby
providing a product authentication mechanism to the consumer
level. NFC technology is used mainly for two reasons. Firstly,
this technology can support public key cryptography on tags
and, secondly, it is available on cell phones enabling them to
act as RFID readers. The former supports our framework in an
offline mode where a connection to the supplier’s database is
no longer required. The latter helps extend the authentication
model to the consumer level, where a consumer uses his cell
phone to authenticate a product.
A. Initialization Phase
Our new anti-counterfeit model is executed in two phases,
the first, namely initialization, being illustrated in Fig. 2. This
phase is initiated from the production line where a serial
number and an EPC are allocated to the product. The serial
number, EPC and the product specification are communicated
to Tag Initiator (TI). Meanwhile, the product is dispatched to
the Tag Embedding department.
On receipt of the information from the production line, the
TI generates a public/private key pair (Kp,Ks). This pair
is unique for each tagged product item. The TI must be a
secure platform as it is responsible for the generation of anti-
counterfeit keys. It stores the EPC in an EPC tag and forms
a string S1 defined by
S1=EPC‖Product S/N‖Product Specification‖Kp
The TI digitally signs this string S1 with his signing key
Ksign and stores the string along with its signature on the
NFC tag. The signature on the tag is stored as a ‘Signature
Record’ according to NFC Forum’s Signature Record Type
Definition [19]. According to this specification, the signature
record consists of a digital signature along with a digital
certificate containing the corresponding verification key Kver.
S1 and its signature are stored at a memory location accessible
to any NFC reader. However, the TI also stores the secret
key Ks inside the tag but at a secure location. This location
of Ks is only accessible to the tag’s processor and therefore
inaccessible to a reader. The corresponding public key Kp is a
part of S1, and therefore accessible to any NFC reader. After
storing the relevant information on both tags, the TI configures
both tags as write protected and dispatches them to the Tag
Embedding department.
On receipt of the tags from the TI, the Tag Embedding
department embeds both tags on the product. Since the tags
are physically embedded we shall assume that any attempt to
remove the tags will destroy them. After embedding the tags,
the products are shipped to the supply line, from whence they
may be delivered to a department store or direct to a consumer
through online shopping.
B. Verification Phase
This phase is executed by the verifier on receipt of the
product. Since this is an offline framework, the verifier does
not require any connection to the supplier’s database. There-
fore the verifier may be a consumer, a warehouse employee,
a member of law enforcement or indeed, any individual
wishing to authenticate the product. The verification phase is
executed in two phases. The first is visual and the second is
cryptographic. The visual verification process is executed as
follows:
• The consumer checks the claimed identity of the product
itself and the integrity of the tag which should be bound
to the product item in a tamper-evident manner.
• The verifier places his cell phone on the NFC tag to read
its contents. The accessible data on the NFC tag (string
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S1 and corresponding signature) is communicated to the
cell phone.
• The cell phone verifies the signature. A successful veri-
fication is an indication that the string S1 is legitimate.
• The cell phone displays the product specification and its
serial number to the consumer.
• The consumer checks the two product descriptions match
each other.
In the case of a successful visual verification, the consumer
should initiate the second phase of product verification, which
is a cryptographic challenge-response protocol:
• The cell phone sends a random challenge r to the NFC
tag.
• The tag signs r with the secret key Ks and returns the
result sign(r) to the cell phone.
• The cell phone verifies the signature using the corre-
sponding verification key Kp which it knows from S1.
A successful verification is a strong indication of a genuine
product, as a counterfeit tag lacks the signing key Ks and so
cannot compute a valid signature on r.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the proposed framework from
various angles. Our model addresses category 2 and 3 of
counterfeits as mentioned in I-A. Categories 1 and 4 are not a
focus of our work since, in the former case, the products are
being identified by the consumers as counterfeits and, in the
latter, can be countered with an appropriate quality control.
Categories 2 and 3 are critical as the consumer is not aware
of the illegitimacy of the product. Since our model is designed
to detect counterfeits at the consumer level, it provides a tool
for consumers to determine the legitimacy of a product.
In the case of category 2 counterfeits where the original
product is reverse engineered, the NFC tag attached to the
original product cannot be reverse engineered – the secret data
on the NFC tag cannot be copied as explained in Section V-B.
A consumer can therefore determine the illegitimacy of a
reverse-engineered product by the unsuccessful verification of
the data on the NFC tag.
In our model, the Tag Initiator (TI) is responsible for
generating and storing the secret keys on the NFC tags. The
tags are then embedded on the product by another department
termed the ‘Tag Embedding Department’. In the case of out-
sourced manufacturers, the product manufacturing and tag
embedding are done by the out-sourced manufacturer. The
TI remains a part of the genuine owner. The genuine owner
provides NFC and EPC tags to the out-sourced manufacturer
only in same quantity as specified in the contract. If an out-
sourced manufacturer is dishonest and produces more than the
quantity mentioned in the contract (category 3 counterfeits),
he will have to produce the product either without the NFC
tag or with a fake NFC tag. This counterfeit product is then
detected by the consumer because making a fake NFC tag is
too difficult (explained in Section V-B). Thus, our model helps
in the detection of category 3 counterfeits at consumer level.
A. Justification for Two RFID Tags
We use two types of tags in our framework, an EPC tag
and an NFC tag. Although both are RFID tags, they have very
different characteristics. The main difference is the operating
frequency: EPC tags operate at 860-960 MHz whereas NFC
tags operate at 13.56 MHz frequency band. The range is
consequently different in the two tags. EPC tags can be read
from 2 to 8 metres whereas NFC tags have a very short
communication range of no more than about 4 cms. This
property makes only the EPC tag suitable for supply chain
management in order to remotely identify the products. Since
EPC tags are already deployed in the market for supply chain
management, we use EPC tags in our framework in order to
maintain the backward compatibility and normal supply chain
needs.
NFC tags are used because two main requirements cannot
be fulfilled by EPC tags. Firstly, EPC tags are very resource
constrained when compared to NFC tags: EPC tags have
very limited computational power and much less memory,
whereas NFC tags, specially NFC Type-4 tags, are much more
powerful. Since our framework is based on PKC and PKI,
where the tag has to perform PKC, we need a reasonably
resourced tag. Secondly, our framework needs to provide
authentication down to the consumer level. Without an NFC
tag, this would require every consumer to be equipped with
an EPC tag reader, which is far from practical. The issue is
resolved with the inclusion of the NFC tag, as the consumer’s
cell phone can act as a reader for the tag.
B. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze our framework from the security
point of view. The goal of an attacker is to develop a clone
tag or a tag with a valid signature. To develop a clone tag, the
attacker must know the private key Ks of the original tag. This
key is stored at an inaccessible location in the tag’s memory
and so it is normally secure from the attacker. The alternative
solution open to an attacker with a cloned tag is to replace the
legitimate public key Kp with the attacker’s public key K ′p
in S1 and store the corresponding private key K ′s in the tag.
However, this is not possible as the legitimate Kp is digitally
signed (it is in a digital certificate) so that any alteration will
invalidate the signature. Of course, the verifier must have a
trusted source for the certificate’s public key in order not to
be duped.
In case an attacker spends time and money to reverse
engineer a single tag and recover its private key Ks, it will not
affect the entire system as the pair Ks,Kp is unique to each
tag. The tags, being cheap, will have few counter-measures
to side channel analysis, which will be a significant threat
in some markets. However, this will avoid a single point of
failure as experienced in Alex et al model.
Our framework is resistant to the bypass attack. The ex-
istence of Kp in S1 is an indication that the tag is equipped
with the anti-cloning feature. This key can neither be removed
nor altered as it is digitally signed. The user’s application on
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the cell phone, once it has detected Kp, will execute the anti-
counterfeiting protocol, thereby resisting the bypass attack.
In addition to cryptographic authentication, our framework
also provides visual product authentication. After scanning the
NFC tag, the product specification and product serial number
is visually displayed on the user’s cell phone display. The
user can visually check and verify the information from the
product or product packaging. Needless to say, there are many
other sources of compromise. For example, the NFC tag could
just return a QR code which connects the consumer’s phone
to the attacker’s website and displays the expected protocol
output and the verification data for the counterfeit product.
Alternatively, the merchant may direct customers who lack
the verification app to the attacker’s website to download
a compromised app that confirms the authenticity of any
product.
The tags have to be tamper-evident. This is to ensure that
they cannot be re-used on counterfeit products. If the tag
were to contain the URL for registering the product under the
manufacturere’s guarantee, customers could be encouraged by
their app to register, the manufacturer could check its database
for duplicate registrations that would flag a clone, and the
manufacturer could advise the consumer if there were such a
problem.
One critical factor in securing the system is the physical
location of the NFC tag in the product. This is an industry
specific decision and requires careful consideration. It is
assumed that the tags are physically embedded on the main
assembly of the product and not on casing/packing or on any
easily replaceable component of the product, very much in the
same way as a watermark or hologram is an integral part of
the item it is protecting. As in the latter case, an attacker just
needs to place the tag embedded component from a legitimate
product into the counterfeit product.
C. Economic Analysis
This section analyzes economic aspects of the proposed
scheme at a broader level.
The inclusion of NFC tags in addition to EPC tags for
product identification requires some additional investment by
the supplier. For simplicity, we assume the additional costs
associated with generating keys, signing certificates, writing
to the tags, embedding the tags, etc. is already included in the
cost of the NFC tag. We also assume that the cost of an item
is independent of the number of such items made, which is
plainly rather naı¨ve.
We only consider loss in the sales revenue because of
counterfeit products. The true loss is much higher and not
just financial. There are various other important aspects such as
loss in distinctiveness of brand image, gradual decline in sales,
unemployment etc, but inclusion of these factors complicates
the analysis too much – our goal is merely to justify the cost
of our anti-counterfeiting scheme.
Let x be the production cost/unit and y the selling price/unit,
∆ = y − x the profit/unit, n the market demand over some
fixed period and p the percentage of counterfeits in the market.
Suppose, by observing his sales, the original manufacturer
is able to make exactly the number of products he can sell,
namely n(1−p). The remaining market share of np consists of
counterfeits from other suppliers. The profit Pr by the original
manufacturer is n ·∆ · (1− p) compared with an ideal profit
of n ·∆ if he were to supply the whole market.
Let c be the unit cost of implementing RFID tags on a
product. This cost includes all associated costs regarding RFID
implementation as mentioned earlier. If no price increase is
allowed and the RFID tags eliminate all counterfeits, the profit
P ′r generated under these conditions is:
P ′r = n · (∆− c)
This represents an increase providing P ′r > Pr, i.e.
n · (∆− c) > n ·∆ · (1− p)
which is equivalent to c < ∆ · p.
The percentage p of counterfeit products depends on various
factors like brand, geographical location, in-store or on-line
etc. It is difficult to find an exact value of p for a specific
brand as the counterfeit products of categories 2, 3 and 4
are indistinguishable. Fortunately, the surveys mentioned in
Section I regarding counterfeit products on eBay are only
measuring a fraction of the total market for the goods in
question – although this may change. Assuming the price of
implementing RFID tags with the required infrastructure is
$2/unit, and assuming p as 7% (which is an estimate by the
Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC)) [1]), our model is suitable for
those businesses where the profit/unit ∆ is greater than $28.50,
i.e. around $30. This is a very rough estimate as it is based
on very simple assumptions. Of course, with higher values of
p, the profit/unit threshold at which the NFC RFID scheme
becomes cost effective decreases. This means that it becomes
suitable for more businesses.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an RFID based anti-counterfeiting
framework at the consumer level. There are two main con-
straints related to this authentication level. Firstly, the indi-
vidual consumer cannot afford to keep an RFID reader to
authenticate a product; and secondly, customers cannot be
provided with access to the supplier’s database because of
intellectual property rights and communication overheads. We
addressed both these constraints by using NFC technology:
an NFC tag is used along with an EPC tag for consumer
level authentication on the reasonable assumption that most
individuals will carry an NFC-enabled mobile phone in the
near future. We provided a dual layer verification mechanism
to a consumer. In the first phase of verification, the product
specifications are displayed to the consumer on his cell phone
for visual verification against the actual product. After success-
ful verification, a cryptographic challenge-response protocol is
executed to authenticate the product. Our proposal is based
in PKC and PKI and successfully detects the counterfeit
products. Analysis shows that the proposed framework is
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suitable for products with a profit/unit above about $30 under
some straightforward assumptions, with about 7% of market
lost to counterfeits, and an approximate cost of $2 per item
for implementing NFC chips in the products. This threshold
makes us conclude that our proposed framework is suitable for
many products for which counterfeiting is a major concern.
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